Quantum walk spread in superposition of position space and entangles walker with the position space providing an inherent quantum advantage for communication protocols. Here we propose two quantum direct communication protocols, a Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) protocol and a Controlled Quantum Dialogue (CQD) protocol using discrete-time quantum walk on a cycle. The proposed protocols have been shown to be unconditionally secure against various attacks such as the intercept-resend attack, the denial of service attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. Additionally, the proposed CQD protocol is shown to be unconditionally secure against an untrusted service provider and both the protocols are shown more secure against the intercept resend attack as compared to the qubit based LM05 protocol.
II. DISCRETE-TIME QUANTUM WALK ON A CYCLE -PRELIMINARIES
Quantum walks are a quantum analogue of the classical random walks. In discrete-time quantum walk on an N -cycle, the walker moves along N discrete points on a cycle [16] , which are represented by N dimensional quantum states |x , orthogonal to each other and belonging to the Hilbert space H p where H p = span{|x , x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}}.
. During each step of the discrete-time quantum walk, the walker moves one position either to his left or to his right based on the result (|0 or |1 ) of the quantum coin, which is given by a two dimensional quantum state |c belonging to the Hilbert space H c where
If the walker is in superposition of the coin sate, it will move to both, left and right simultaneously, creating a state which is in superposition in position space. Thus, the initial state of the walker starting at position x in and with an initial coin state |c in can be considered to be in superposition of the two allowed basis states given by
The dynamics of the walker during each step of the walk is governed by the action of the unitary operator, a composition of a quantum coin operation on the coin space followed by a conditioned position shift operation on the complete Hilbert space [17] [18] [19] , U = U (θ, ξ, ζ) = S(I p ⊗ R c ).
Here I p is the identity operator on position space and the quantum coin operation, R c = R c (θ, ξ, ζ) = e iξ cos θ e iζ sin θ e −iζ sin θ e −iξ cos θ .
In simpler cases, when ζ = ξ = 0 or fixed to a specific value, R c (θ, ξ, ζ) = R c (θ) is the coin operator on the coin space. The shift operator on H = H p ⊗ H c , which shifts the position of the walker in the direction which is determined by the coin state is given by
The state after t steps of the walk on an N −cycle in general will be in the form,
and the probability of finding the walker at any position x after t steps of walk will be P (x, t) = |α x,t | 2 + |β x,t | 2 . In addition to the quantum walk evolution operator, we will also define the translation operator and measurement operator which will be needed for QSCD and CQD protocols. The translation operator is defined on the space H p in the form given by
and the measurement operator M is defined on the entire space H in the form given by
Note that [T (y), U ] = 0 i.e., T (y) and U commute with each other [15] .
III. THE PROTOCOLS
The extent of spread of the discrete-time quantum walk in position space is mainly governed by the parameter θ in the quantum coin operation [18, 19] . Therefore, in this paper we will keep only the coin parameter θ as a variable parameter while keeping the parameters ξ and ζ constant throughout the protocols. Here we first present the encoding scheme, and then we present the protocols for QSDC and CQD. Schematic representation of the protocols for QSDC and and CQD are presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 , respectively. In both the figures, the "random path switcher" is a device that switches the path of the quantum channel so as to move a particular state into encoding the message or into checking eavesdropping, similar to using a physical lever that is used for changing the railway tracks.
A. Encoding of the message
The message m (or a part m of the total message) is encoded on a discrete-time quantum walk state |φ = B. Discrete-time quantum walk based QSDC protocol 1. Alice prepares n discrete-time quantum walk states. To prepare n quantum walk states, Alice randomly chooses 3n integers {t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n }, {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n } and {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n } such that x i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}, c i ∈ {0, 1} and t i ∈ N∪{0} ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and n random real numbers {θ 1 , θ 2 , ..., θ n } such that θ i ∈ [0, 2π]. Thus, she prepares n discrete-time quantum walk states [U (θ i )] ti |x i |c i = U ti |x i |c i ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and sends these states to Bob. (In the rest of this and the next protocol, we will refer to [U (θ i )] as U ).
2. On receiving the walk states from Alice, Bob randomly chooses n/2 of them for checking eavesdropping and classically sends their corresponding coordinates i to Alice. Alice classically sends to Bob the corresponding values of t i , x i , c i , and θ i . Bob applies the corresponding operation U −ti on those states, measures them and checks the measurement result with the value of x i and c i . If the error is within a tolerable limit, he continues to step 3. Otherwise, the protocol is aborted and they will start the protocol all over again.
3. Out of the remaining n/2 walk states, Bob chooses n/4 of them for encoding the message. On each of those n/4
states, Bob codes a part of his message m i by applying the translation operator T (m i ) ⊗ I c . He does nothing to the other n/4 states (let us call them decoy states). He then sends all the n/2 states back to Alice.
4. Once Alice confirms the receiving of the states, Bob classically sends the coordinates of the decoy states to Alice. Alice applies the corresponding operator U −ti on the decoy states and checks for eavesdropping just like how Bob does it in step 2.
Once no eavesdropping is confirmed, Alice then applies U
−ti on the remaining n/4 message states and measures them to obtain the message sent by Bob. 1. Charlie prepares n discrete-time quantum walk states. To prepare n quantum walk states, Charlie randomly chooses 3n integers {t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n }, {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n } and {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n } such that x i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}, c i ∈ {0, 1} and t i ∈ N ∪ {0} ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and n random real numbers {θ 1 , θ 2 , ..., θ n } such that θ i ∈ [0, 2π]. He prepares n quantum walk states [U (θ i )] ti |x i |c i = U ti |x i |c i ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and sends these states to Alice.
2. On receiving the walk states, Alice randomly chooses n/2 of them for checking eavesdropping and classically sends their corresponding coordinates i to Charlie. Charlie classically sends to Alice the corresponding values of t i , x i , c i , and θ i . Alice applies the operation U −ti on those states and measures them and checks the measurement result with the value of x i and c i . If the error is within a tolerable limit, Alice continues to step 3. Otherwise, the protocol is aborted and they restart the protocol from the beginning.
3. Out of the remaining n/2 walk states, Alice chooses n/4 of them for encoding the message. On each of those n/4 states, Alice encodes a part of her message a i by applying the translation operator T (a i ). She does nothing to the other n/4 states (let us call them decoy states). She then chooses a random integer k and coin parameter θ r , applies [U (θ r )] k on all the n/2 states and sends the states to Bob. 
IV. SECURITY
In this section, we analyse the security of our protocol against various attacks, namely the intercept-resend attack, the denial of service attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and the attack by an untrusted Charlie.
A. Intercept-and-resend attack
In this attack, Eve intercepts the quantum channel and tries to extract information from the incoming state by measuring it. Then, she re-prepares the appropriate state (based on the information she receives) and sends it to the receiver. Our protocols are robust against this attack. This is due to the fact that the discrete-time quantum walk states are usually superposition states where the position and the coin Hilbert spaces are usually entangled. Hence, Eve can't determine the incoming state by measurement alone. Instead of directly measuring the state, Eve can apply U −ti and then measure the state. But this attack also cannot be performed by Eve because the value of t i will be only known to Alice at the time of attack. If Eve attempts to perform this attack, she will raise the error during the eavesdropping checking of the control mode states, and hence will be caught.
Mutual Information between Alice and Eve
In practical scenarios, Alice can choose her parameters t i , x i , c i , and θ i only from a finite set or a finite range of values. Hence, the amount of mutual information I AE gained between Alice and Eve during the intercept-resend attack is dependent upon the size of these sets and ranges. The higher the mutual information, the more will be known by Eve about the state sent by Alice, thus making the protocol less secure. Let us consider a practical scenario where Alice can choose:
• t i from the set T containing n(T ) integers (from 0 to n(T ) − 1)
• x i from the set X ={0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1} (set of N values), N being the dimension of the position space
• c i from the set C ={0, 1} (set of 2 values)
Let us say, that for a particular round of transmission, Alice chooses the values t A ∈ T , x A ∈ X, c A ∈ C, and θ A ∈ R θ and prepares the state |ψ A = [U (θ A )] t A |x A |c A . Now Eve can perform the intercept-resend attack in two ways, 1. directly measure the incoming state to obtain the position and coin values x E and c E respectively (Let us call this strategy IR1) , or 2. randomly choose the values t E ∈ T , x E ∈ X, c E ∈ C, and θ E ∈ R θ and perform the operation [U (θ E )] −t E |ψ A and then measure the position and coin values of the resulting state in order to obtain the values x E and c E respectively (let us call this strategy IR2).
Let us now examine IR2. We can consider t A , x A , c A , t E , x E , c E , θ A , and θ E as uniformly distributed random variables, where t A , x A , c A , t E , x E , c E are discrete and θ A and θ E are continuous. Now, for IR2, the mutual information I AE2 between Alice and Eve is given by,
where p(a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n ) is the joint probability distribution-mass function of the random variables a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n where
For IR1, the mutual information I AE1 between Alice and Eve is given by,
The above formulas of I AE1 and I AE2 contain 1 and 2 integrals respectively. Due to lack of access to good computing power to calculate I AE1 and I AE2 , we modify the protocol for the purpose of analysis of this attack, by keeping all the coin parameters, including θ constant and publicly known throughout the protocol, thus reducing the number of secret parameters and avoiding the integrals. Now, the revised formulas for I AE1 and I AE2 will be
and
where
and p(a i ) = a1,,a2,...,ai−1,ai+1,...,an p(a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n ) (14) where a j ∈ {t A , x A , c A , t E , x E , c E } and U = U (θ) where θ is the publicly known coin parameter throughout the protocol. We can see that I AE1 and I AE2 are a function of n(T ) and N , and also depend on the fixed coin parameter θ. . The variation of IAE with N is fluctuating in the beginning, but later steadily increases. For both the plots, the coin parameters ζ and ξ were set to a fixed value In Fig. 3(a) , we can see that I AE is at its lowest when θ is an odd multiple of π 4 and is at its highest (I AE = 1) when θ is an even multiple of π 4 . Hence, for θ equal to even multiples of π 4 , the security of the protocol will be compromised. This is consistent with the discrete-time quantum walk dynamics, for θ being even multiples of π 4 , the walk will either be localized around the origin or will be ballistic without being in superposition of more than two position space at a time [18, 19] . We can infer that the degree of spread of the walker in position space gives an enhanced security to the protocol. In Fig. 3(b) , we can see that for odd N , I AE increases with increase in N , whereas for even N , I AE initially decreases with N , but then increases. In Fig. 4 , we see that I AE decreases with n(T ) and its value is greater for even N than for odd N . In fact, for odd N , the I AE drops much below 0.5 (which is the I AE value for the LM05 protocol (see appendix)) for large n(T ), and in fact is less than 0.25 for n(T ) > 25. From Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 3 , we can see that I AE2 > I AE1 , implying that that IR2 is a better strategy for Eve than IR1 for odd N . This shows that, for an odd, low value of N , and a high value of n(T ), and θ being an odd multiple of π 4 , our discrete-time quantum walk protocols are more secure against the intercept-resend attack than the LM05 protocol (whose I AE = 0.5), even with the modification that the coin parameters remain constant and publicly known throughout the protocol.
B. Denial of Service attack
Instead of trying to extract information from the incoming state, Eve can rather perform a denial-of-service attack i.e., she can just stop the incoming state from going forward and can instead prepare and send a random discrete-time quantum walk state. This attack also cannot be performed by Eve because if she does so, she introduces an added error and noise into the channel and hence the eavesdropping checking performed by the sender and the receiver at each quantum channel will detect Eve. The dash-dotted line (magenta coloured in online and colour-printed versions) represents the IAE for one channel of the LM05 protocol, which is the same as the IAE for the BB84 protocol. In both the figures, IAE decreases with n(T ), thus increasing security of the protocol with increase in n(T ). For both the plots, the coin parameters θ, ζ and ξ were set to a fixed value 
C. Man-in-the-middle attack
Let's consider the QSDC protocol. In this attack, Eve initially puts the incoming state from Alice into her quantum memory. Then, she sends her own walk state to Bob. Bob, assuming that Alice may have sent this state, encodes his message on this state and sends it back to Alice. Eve intercepts that channel also and reads the message. She then encodes the message onto the Alice's state which she had earlier stored in her quantum memory and sends it back to Alice, thus being able to read the message. Eve can perform a similar kind of attack in the CQD protocol to obtain the message of one of the two communicating parties. In both cases of this attack, Eve will be detected by the communicating parties during eavesdropping checking. Hence both our protocols are unconditionally secure against this attack.
D. Attack by an untrusted Charlie
Let us consider the QDC protocol. In this attack, Charlie intercepts the Alice-Bob channel, applies U −ti on the incoming state and obtains Alice's message by measuring the state. Then, he re-prepares the state and sends it to Bob. Then when Bob encodes his message b i and announces the value a i + b i , Charlie can then get Bob's message as well. But our QDC protocol is robust against this attack because as Alice applies an additional [U (θ r )] k to the states, Charlie will not know the value of θ r or k and hence he cannot apply [U (θ r )] −k to retrieve the state.
V. CONCLUSION
The unique features of discrete-time quantum walks such as spreading the quantum state in superposition of position space and entanglement generation between the position and the coin states has an immense unexplored potential for quantum security for communication and cryptographic protocols. In this work, we have explored its potential for providing cryptographic security by proposing two new protocols, a one-way two-party Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) protocol and a two-way three-party Controlled Quantum Dialogue (CQD) protocol. We have shown that the proposed protocols are unconditionally secure against various attacks, such as the intercept-resend attack, the denial of service attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. The CQD protocol, in particular, is shown to be secure against an attack by an untrusted Charlie. Also, for the intercept-resend attack, the mutual information gained between Alice and Eve is shown to be much lower for the proposed protocols as compared to the qubit based protocols such as the LM05 protocol [6] , thus making the proposed protocols more secure than LM05 against this attack. Also, unlike the qubit based protocols which transfer just one bit per state, the proposed protocols can transfer multiple bits per state [20] , which can possibly lead to advantages such as faster transmission of messages and a lower requirement of resources (both subject to practical/experimental conditions). These direct communication schemes could potentially lead to secure feasible solutions for many social and economic problems such as the socialist millionaire problem [21] , quantum E-commerce [22] , quantum voting [23] and the work towards finding these potential solutions is to be attempted in the future.
where p(x, y) is the joint probability mass function and p(x) and p(y) are the individual probability mass functions. If x and y are continuous, then the formula for I XY is given by
Where p(x, y) is the joint probability density function and p(x) and p(y) are the individual probability density functions.
There can also be a case where one of the random variables is discrete and the other is continuous. For example, if x is discrete and y is continuous, then the formula for I XY becomes
where p(x) is the probability mass function of x, p(y) is the probability density function of y and p(x, y) is a function that is a probability density-mass function that is discrete in x and continuous in y. This concept of mutual information can also be generalized to r = mn > 2 random variables {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x m } and {y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n } where x i are discrete and y i are continuous. The generalised mutual information I mutual is given by [24] I mutual = x1,x2,...,xn y1,...,yn p(x 1 , x 2 , ..., x m , y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n )log 2 p(x 1 , x 2 , ..., x m , y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n ) p(x 1 )p(x 2 )...p(x m )p(y 1 )p(y 2 )...p(y n ) dy 1 dy 2 ...dy n . (18) Mutual Information for the intercept-resend attack for the LM05 protocol:
Let us consider the first transmission from Alice to Bob. In this transmission, Alice first selects either of the four states and prepares them and sends them to Bob. Eve intercepts this channel before the state reaches Bob and randomly chooses a basis for each incoming state and measures the state in that basis. Let a, e ∈ {0, 1, +, −}. Let the probability of Alice sending the qubit a and Eve receiving the qubit e be p(a, e). For example, the probability p(0, 0) is p(0, 0) = 
Similarly,
and similar probabilities for p(1, e), p(+, e), and p(−, e), where e ∈ {0, 1, +, −} Hence, the mutual information I AE for the LM05 protocol is given by
p(a, e)log 2 p(a, e) p(a)p(e) 
